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Abstract 
Purpose - Threats of extreme events, such as terrorist attacks or infrastructure breakdown, 
are potentially highly disruptive events for all types of organizations.  This paper takes a 
political perspective to power in strategic decision making and how this influences planning 
for extreme events.   
Design/methodology/approach -  A sample of one hundred and sixty informants drawn from 
one hundred and thirty five organizations which are part of the critical national infrastructure 
in the UK forms the empirical basis of this paper.  Most of these organizations had publicly 
placed business continuity and preparedness as a strategic priority.  The paper adopts a 
qualitative approach coding data from focus groups. 
Findings -  In nearly all cases there is a pre-existing dominant coalition which keeps business 
continuity decisions off the strategic agenda.  The only exceptions to this are a handful of 
organizations which provide continuous production, such as some utilities, where disruption 
to business as usual can be readily quantified. The data reveal structural and decisional 
elements of the exercise of power.  Structurally, the dominant coalition centralise control by 
ensuring that only a few functional interests participate in decision making.   
Research implications - Decisional elements of power emphasise the dominance of 
calculative rationality where decisions are primarily made on information and arguments 
which can be quantified. Finally, the paper notes the recursive aspect of power relations 
whereby agency and structure are mutually constitutive over time. Organizational structures 
of control are maintained, despite the involvement of managers charged with organizational 
preparedness and resilience, who remain outside the dominant coalition. 
Originality/value -  The paper  constitutes a first attempt to show how planning for 
emergencies fits within the strategy making process and how politically controlled this 
process is. 
 
Keywords: 
Strategic decision making, Power, Coalitions, Extreme events, Agency, 
Structure. 
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Introduction 
This paper takes a political perspective on strategic decision making in the face of extreme 
events.   Strategic decisions are the handful of decisions which help shape what is called 
organizational strategy (Mintzberg et al., 1976; Hickson et al., 1986).  Such decisions are 
likely to be planned or emergent (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) but a common factor is that 
all are almost always taken in a context of risk or uncertainty.  Since the future cannot be 
known precisely and since knowledge is imperfect, decision makers have to ‘muddle 
through’ (Lindblom, 1959) balancing actions (what they do) with what they know and do not 
know about a strategic (important) problem.  Much of the early research on strategy and 
strategic decision making made two key assumptions, both turning out later to be largely 
unfounded (Wilson, 1992).  The first was that the making of strategic decisions was an 
analytically rational set of activities and the second was that managerial agency had primacy 
in shaping what happened. 
Research on risk and uncertainty revealed that the above assumptions were ill-founded. Risk 
describes situations in which there are measurable probabilities, whilst uncertainty refers to 
situations where no such probabilities can be assessed.  Risk and uncertainty are, therefore, 
measures of the degree of ambiguity in a decision (Knight, 1921; Hertz and Thomas, 1983; 
Miller and Bromiley, 1990; Palmer and Wiseman 1999).   All strategic decisions are taken in 
the context of both uncertainty and risk.   Decisions are about future states of affairs and are 
based on incomplete information and managers therefore cannot be analytically rational in 
making such decisions. They also commit resources which could otherwise be used 
elsewhere in organizations, hence there is a large degree of opportunity cost.   Putting 
resources into one project therefore carries with it varying degrees of risk. It might be a poor 
choice and jeopardize the chances of taking an alternative course of action.  Following Cohen 
et al (1972) we argue that ambiguity in decision making provides a context in which 
increasingly competing and contested claims can be made from various individuals and 
functions in the organization.  Ambiguity promotes inconsistent and ill-defined preferences 
throughout the organization.  In addition, ambiguity forces decision makers to look to past 
experiences to inform current actions (to try and reduce uncertainty) and, finally, only some 
individuals and functions will be involved in the strategic decision making process and, 
hence, able to influence what happens (Cohen et al., 1972:1).  Cohen and his colleagues 
called these decision situations “anarchic” and argue that this was the norm rather than the 
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exception in strategic decision making, particularly where levels of uncertainty were 
relatively high (they use a decision in a University as an example). 
Following  Cohen et al (1972; Hickson et al 1986; Hickson et al, 2003; Miller at al., 
2004:2008)   it is arguable that as ambiguity facing managers and organizations increases, 
then so too does the propensity for organizational anarchy (and politics) to emerge. That is, 
preferences (priorities) are likely to be unclear and participation in the decision process is 
likely to involve some interests and not others. This paper examines that proposition.  Data 
from organizations facing the threat of extreme events are used to show how (and if) 
organizational anarchy increases in the face of these shocks and how power is exercised by 
specific interests in the organization and not by others.  First, we provide some contextual 
material concerning extreme events. 
 
Extreme Events 
Extreme events are a broad category of largely ‘exogenous jolts’ (Meyer, 1982) faced (or 
potentially faced) by organizations which can include ‘normal accidents’ such as the Bhopal 
explosion (Perrow, 1999), man-made disasters such as Columbia (Turner, 1976;1978), 
natural disasters such as the South East Asian Tsunami or Hurricane Katrina or the threat or 
act of terrorism (Sullivan-Taylor and Wilson, 2009).  The distinction between man-made and 
natural disasters is not as clear as might be thought, however.  Somers (2008:63) reminds us 
that Hurricane Katrina was as much a man-made disaster as a physical disaster, especially in 
the aftermath where “the world was stunned by the callous indifference and utter ineptitude 
of government” which exacerbated death and destruction as much as the forces of nature.  
But that is a topic for another paper.   Energy insecurity, organized crime, pandemics and the 
consequences of conflicts in the world are equally examples of extreme events which 
organizations face (Cornish, 2007).  Depending on such factors as sector and location, 
organizations are likely to view different events as extreme, since the local effects will be felt 
differentially.  Farmers and food producers, for example are likely to rate an outbreak of an 
infectious disease amongst cattle (such as foot and mouth) very highly, whilst an energy 
utility is likely to give primacy to infrastructure breakdown, for example (Cornish, 2007). 
Nearly all authors argue that organizations are badly designed for (and ill-prepared for) both 
exogenous and endogenous jolts.  As a result, things go badly wrong (Anheier, 1999).  For 
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example, Perrow (1984) argued that one key factor is the mismatch between organizational 
structure and its technology in use. The explosion in the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, 
India, was argued to be a result of the firm growing in size but not adapting to new 
technologies. When a switch was accidentally thrown, giving a false ‘all systems OK’ 
message, by the time the problem was recognized it was too late. No individual had the 
capacity to stop the (by now) inevitable explosion which caused long-term damage to human 
and plant life. 
Alexander (1996) argues that the bursting of a gas pipeline in New Jersey in March 1994 was 
a direct result of the organizational structure of the Texas Eastern Transmission Company, 
which was traditional, centralized and inflexible, unable to cope with the demands of gas 
transmission. Greening and Johnson (1996) argue that highly interactive, tightly coupled and 
high-risk technologies can spell high risk in an organizational structure which is bureaucratic 
and inflexible. They argued that one of the problems of such organizations is the inability of 
top-level managers to cope with (or to prevent) disasters.  Perhaps the most damning 
catalogue of organizational inability to cope with disasters can be found in Starbuck and 
Farjoun (2005) and Woods (2005) who argued that blame for the Challenger space shuttle 
disaster was wholly organizational in origin.  Foam insulation ‘strikes’ (NASA terminology) 
caused damage to the shuttle causing it to break up on re-entry killing all on board (1st 
February 2003).  According to Woods (2005), organizational failures included the 
unreasonable requirement to be efficient (under time pressure) and thorough at the same time; taking 
past successes as indications of future performance; fragmented decision making; failure to 
revise estimates/actions as new evidence accumulated and poor communication between 
organizational sub-units. 
A contrary view is taken by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001).  They propose the concept of high 
reliability organizations (HROs) which have the capacity to prosper no matter the extent of 
the uncertainties it faces. Resilient companies meticulously prepare for the worst and 
establish routines enabling them to improvise rapid responses to crises. Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2001) argue that HROs exhibit mindfulness, meaning a combination of high alertness, 
flexibility, and adaptability which, in turn, lead to increased resilience.  
 
The resilience perspective has had a strong influence on governments in the UK and 
elsewhere.  In the UK, the government took action following the fuel protests and widespread 
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flooding in 2000 and the foot and mouth epidemic of 2001) by way of the Civil 
Contingencies Act which came into force in 2004.  This places duties on local authorities, 
emergency services etc. (known as category 1 providers) and for a range of private sector 
companies (known as category 2) to co-operate and share relevant information with Category 
1 organizations. The act however as it stands has very little 'teeth' in that the co-operation and 
sharing cannot really be enforced (the act is currently under review for this reason).  
This act encourages category 1 and 2 organizations to appoint managers charged with 
providing organizational preparedness and resilience.  We refer to these generically as 
business continuity managers throughout this paper.  Their role is to advise and talk with 
senior managers with regard to increasing organizational preparedness.  Such appointments 
were meant to persuade senior managers to adopt and foster the above features of an HRO.  
Key decisions were expected to be made regarding organizational resilience and 
preparedness.  A key question of this paper concerns to what extent this Act and the 
appointment of one or more business continuity managers were able to influence strategic 
decision making in UK organizations.  To examine this (and related) questions we turn to the 
concepts of power and decision making in organizations in the following section. 
 
Theoretical Background  
Early organization theorists showed that strategic decision making was neither a wholly 
planned nor a rational analytical activity.  For example, in an examination of the Cuban 
Missile’s Crisis, Allison (1969; 1971) showed how strategic decision making primarily 
involves many interests (in today’s jargon, ‘stakeholders’) who fight it out between 
themselves both to influence the process of the decision and its outcome so these fit as far as 
possible with their ‘interests’.  Strategic decision making is, therefore, not only complex but 
is also a political game played out between both personal interests and functional perspective. 
An organization, therefore, can be seen as an arena for decision making games (Crozier, 
1964; 1976) in which a range of interests benefit (and a range do not) from particular 
decisions.  However, all interests have an over-riding stake in the survival of the 
organization, so political processes are unlikely to become so acute that they fragment or seal 
the demise of the organization.  Such ‘schismatic tendencies’ (Morgan, 1981) are, therefore, 
mostly avoided.  Hence the organization remains in business providing a continuing context 
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in which different interests can fight their corner to try and influence both the process and the 
outcome of a decision.  
Such power games are, in organization theory, typically depicted as a function of resource 
dependencies derived from the division of labour in complex organizations.  From this 
perspective, task specialization confers power as we have seen above (Hickson et al, 1971; 
Hinings et al., 1974; Pfeffer, 1981).  A counter perspective argues that the given structures 
(from which the dependency perspectives are derived) are, in fact, the outcomes of political 
behaviours which have resulted in the installation of elites and regimes of control within any 
organization (Foucault, 1976, Clegg, 1989).  It is the processes by which such control of 
resources and strategic contingencies become created, legitimated and sedimented in 
organizations which confer power.   Such a perspective can be seen readily in the neo-
Marxist tradition (see, for example, Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980) which suggest that the 
creation and continuation of organizational elites who can control what happens in decision 
making, are simply reflective of capitalist structures more generally in which divide and rule 
is the norm, exercised by elites who are in control.  Those who are already powerful in 
organizations will exercise that power by trying to influence decisions in line with their own 
interests of staying in power, benefitting from the outcomes of a decision and continuing to 
divide and rule.1 
Both arguments are, in themselves, unsatisfactory since they each represent an unwavering 
and unchanging principle to which the foundations of power are anchored.  There is also the 
argument that each is the subject of the other in a form of structuration of power (Giddens,     
1979; 1984).  That is, each is not simply a dichotomous perspective, but the one acts upon 
and reinforces the other in a recursive fashion over time.  Some years before Giddens’ 
depiction of structuration, the French author Karpik (1972) had noted similar recursive 
tendencies with regard to decision making.  Karpik argued that what mattered most in the 
politics of decision making was not what came first (the division of labour or the creation of 
elites) but was the ‘constancy of interest’ across decisions over time.  It was this constancy 
which meant that a fairly set group of interests influenced decisions in particular ways.  Over 
time a theme would develop from these decisions which defined an organization’s strategy.2 
Other authors disagreed with the constancy of influence thesis arguing that Karpik’s 
perspective on power means that power is synonymous with structure.   For example, Crozier 
and Friedberg (1977) argue that individuals, coalitions and groups interact with one another 
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against the context of the organization in what they describe as a game – an ‘ensemble de 
jeux’.  There are no fixed structures or dependencies which will apply in all cases of decision 
making (they argued).  The powerful in one decision could become the powerless in a 
subsequent decision.  Daudi (1986) shows this phenomenon in action in a detailed case study, 
although he does argue later in his book that interdependencies between interests in 
organizations may have a more enduring quality than the power game perspective (or his case 
study) would suggest.  In other words, power constellations can persist unchanged across a 
number of decisions.   
Empirical support for this view of relatively enduring power is provided by Miller et al 
(2008).  In a study of 55 strategic decisions across public and private sector organizations, 
they found an enduring pattern of involvement and influence over decisions (in both 
formulation and implementation).  In decision-making (formulation), the four key most 
involved functions (Marketing, Finance, P/SD and Suppliers), plus the CEO, emerged as the 
most influential.   They are joined by Purchasing, R & D and Shareholders/Auditors who, 
though not involved as frequently, have an influential voice in decision-making when called 
in.   
In implementation, R & D remains influential as do Marketing, P/SD and Finance.  Suppliers, 
however, lose much of their influence as might be expected when the details of 
implementation become the responsibility of other functions inside the organization.   The 
influence of Purchasing also disappears almost completely when it comes to 
implementation.  Those who are less involved overall tend to have lower influence.   
We argue that the dominance of the above interests as powerful and influential players in the 
decision power game is no accident.  Each of the interests brings a strong element of 
calculative rationality to the decision process.  We view calculative rationality as a series of 
institutionalised patterns of counting, accounting and measurement typically geared toward 
efficiency either for profit on behalf of shareholders or to deliver best value for stakeholders.  
As Miller et al (2008) found, the CEO, Finance, Marketing and delivery of goods or services 
were key players, all characterised by a strong adherence and utilisation of what could be 
measured, calculated and presented as a seemingly rational ‘account’ of desired actions in the 
decision process.  For example, institutionalised practices of calculability such as accounting 
are a pervasive and powerful currency in maintaining the ‘rational’ state of organizations. As 
a technology of government and power, the calculable practice of management accountancy 
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offers “…the ability to translate diverse and complex processes into a single financial figure” 
(Miller 2001; 381).  This has been a central feature of organization since the genesis of 
managerialism (Chandler, 1977; Hoskin and Macve, 1994) a product of Weberian rational 
bureaucracy.  The processes of strategic and operational planning are interwoven with the 
tenets of management accounting “…encompassing a growing body of techniques which 
have been developed in light of the needs which management have to plan, control and make 
decisions” (Roslender, 1992; 135).   
 
The distinction between rational and non-rational strategies for dealing with risk (Zinn, 2008) 
confirms that organizations typically will engage in the calculative processes of weighing the 
pros and cons and providing and insuring against extreme events (see Table 1).  Accounting 
underpins the rational organization by providing the rational measures, calculations and 
projections used by managers to make strategic decisions (Carruthers, 1995).  We therefore 
suggest that, as uncertainties increase in decision making (in the context of being prepared for 
extreme events), it is likely that decision participants will demand and seek evidence and 
information which conforms to this calculative rationality. 
 
Table 1. Orthodox contradiction of rational and non-rational strategies. 
Managing risk and uncertainty 
by… 
Rational strategies such as… 
Weighing of pros and cons, 
calculation 
Non-rational strategies such 
as…  
Belief, hope, faith 
Managing possible negative 
outcomes by… 
Provision, insurance avoidance 
(Adapted from Zinn, 2008; 440) 
On the other hand, organizations are not static, unchanging, monoliths.  The very scope and 
scale of the responses reflected in our own dataset on preparedness for extreme events 
alongside other powerful and high-profile social discourses such as global warming, binge 
drinking, sustainability and carbon neutrality all signal changes in the competitive operating 
environment and may instigate organizational changes.  Such opposing views raise a set of 
key questions regarding power and decision making.  To what extent is there continuity in the 
composition (and influence) of the dominant coalition in the face of extreme events?  
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These issues can be summarised as a set of propositions and a key question which are 
addressed in this paper, namely: 
Propositions 
There will be strong tendencies for the dominant power constellation in an organization to 
remain unchanged as the key influence over all strategic decisions including decisions over 
extreme events. 
 
Organizations in categories 1 and 2 will have appointed one or more senior managers to deal 
with continuity (and to exercise influence) in the face of extreme events to increase levels of 
preparedness for and responses to extreme events. 
 
Key Question 
To what extent does the appointment of new business continuity managers and the pressures 
to adopt high reliability organizational characteristics alter the balance of power in relation to 
strategic decisions concerning organizational preparedness?   Does the composition and 
constitution of the dominant power constellation change or remain constant? 
 
First, we provide some details of sample, method and research design adopted in this study. 
 
Sample 
Eleven focus groups were conducted across the UK on the subject of Organizational 
Resilience to extreme events. The groups comprised one hundred and sixty-one senior level 
managers drawn from one hundred and thirty five organizations situated across the public, 
private and voluntary sectors. The  groups examined strategic decision making, resilience and 
contingency planning for conditions of extreme uncertainty. 
The research took a theoretical approach to the sampling and the organizations selected for 
inclusion in this stage of the study were adapted from a range of possible targets for terrorist 
attack as identified by Cornish (2007) (see Table 2).  Organizations were selected on the basis 
that they were part of the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), supported the CNI or played 
a role in the normal every day functioning of society (e.g. clean water supply). This approach 
was informed by a pilot study (see Sullivan-Taylor and Wilson, 2009).  This framework 
produced a sample of 135 organizations from the public and private sector, including 
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National and Regional Government, Multinationals and Small to Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs).  
Table 2: Overview of Key Sectors (adapted from Cornish, 2007) 
 Description of Sector   Example Organizations 
1. Strategic  
 
Utilities, Nuclear power stations, pharmaceutical factories, 
Houses of Parliament, government and military key points 
2. Transport infrastructure  Road tunnels, airports, docks and railway networks 
3. Economic lifeline Banking and financial institutions and areas 
4. Communications 
infrastructure  
Media and broadcast organizations 
5. Computer network  Computing systems vulnerable to software attack 
6. Soft targets Hotels, apartment blocks, shopping malls, sports stadiums, 
high street cafes 
7. Postcard targets The Tower of London, the Millennium Wheel, Stonehenge 
8. Small and Medium 
Enterprises 
Including networks representing SME communities 
 
A number of key networks including the Confederation of British Industry3 and local and 
regional government resilience networks and fora were used to identify and to invite 
participants to attend the focus groups. The involvement of these network organizations is 
integral to the research design.  Typically, the practice and effects of strategic decision 
making occur within delineated bounds of  an organization however, the construction and 
communication of ‘risk’ and ‘preparedness’ used to make these decisions lie outside of 
conventional organizational boundaries.  The key networks were employed to build a 
theoretical sample (Glaser, Strauss et al. 1968; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  Using the key 
sectors identified in Table 2, strategic decision makers were invited to participate in the 
research.   
 
Table 3 gives an example of the composition of a typical focus group. This gives a range of 
the key UK senior representatives from target organizations in our sample. In terms of 
organizational job role and hierarchical level, participants of the focus ranged from business 
continuity, risk or security managers to Directors and Chairman. The focus groups were 
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oversubscribed demonstrating the high level of interest from a range of stakeholders in this 
area of emerging policy and practice. 
Table 3: Example of Focus Group Composition 
Organizational Role of Participant  Organization 
Acting Managing Director Transport infrastructure (private sector) 
Head of Corporate Affairs Transport infrastructure (private sector)  
Corporate Director  Regional Development Agency 
Regional Director Corporate network 
Chairman Transport infrastructure (private sector)  
Acting Head of Regional Resilience  Regional Government 
Partner Computer network  
Regional Operations Manager Transport infrastructure (public sector) 
Head of Large Corporate Team Economic lifeline  
Director Farmers’ Union  
Business Resilience Manager Strategic (utility)  
Director , Commercial & Hazardous Waste Strategic (utility)  
Chairman Regional Enterprise Board  
 
Focus groups were taped to enable the transcription and codification of the data.  In addition, 
open-ended data from workbooks was inputted to a tailor made online database in order to 
capture the data and its transfer in electronic form.  The focus group transcripts and the 
workbook database were then imported to NVivo. The analysis took the form of an 
interpretive thematic coding, drawing on elements of both content analysis and grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1968).  This approach was taken to safeguard against being 
overwhelmed by the data or destroying its meaning through over-intensive coding 
(Eisenhardt, 1999: 137).  To maintain the integrity of the original texts several readings of the 
data were undertaken independently by the authors to identify common and enduring themes.  
There was substantial agreement over broad key themes.  Two broad themes emerged 
focussing on the politicisation of decision making about extreme events. One theme from the 
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data was the quantification of risk, where quantification appeared to be a necessary factor in 
order to get risks from extreme events on to the strategic agenda (Hoskin, 1996).   Espeland 
and Sauder (2007) describe this as a process of commensuration, whereby qualitative 
phenomena are turned into quantitative in order to gain both perceived validity and attention 
by decision makers.  A second broad theme was the constant composition and dominance 
over decision making of the dominant power constellation despite the appointment of new 
managers to oversee and make decisions about business continuity.  The data were analysed 
around these two core themes using keywords to interrogate the data in vivo, maintaining the 
original form of the responses.  
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
Defining Extreme Events 
The variety of extreme events, as described by participant organizations, is wide, reinforcing 
the notion that these events are predominantly subjectively defined (see Appendix A).  
Nevertheless, a common feature of all these depictions is that an extreme event is one which 
would disrupt the entire organization, possibly causing its downfall at worst and serious 
disruption at best.  Specifically, we are dealing in this paper with the perceived threat of 
extreme events and decisions made to make contingency plans and actions should the event 
occur.  Figure 1 depicts a schematic representation of informants’ definitions and table 4 
illustrates defining characteristics of extreme events. 
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Figure 1. Defining Extreme Events: A Schematic Representation. 
 
We therefore define extreme events as “determined within organizational context; 
characteristically unprecedented or unplanned occurrences that impact upon business as usual 
through the disruption or destruction of key resources.”  Table 4 illustrates some key 
examples from participants in the study. 
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Table 4. Defining Characteristics of ‘Extreme Events’. 
Defining Characteristic  Examples from respondents 
Organizational Context “Power outage at site/city.  No systems on primary site. Declaration of 
war – staff cannot come to work” 
 
“unable to deliver courses and teaching to students” 
 
“Contamination exposure, accidental events” 
 
“Extreme weather, terrorism, security/reputation incident (denial of 
services), total loss of utilities – power/water/telecoms” 
 
“severe weather” 
Unprecedented/Unplanned “An extreme event would be something that is beyond the scope of 
normal business planning – such as [a] bomb, pandemic flu, or impact 
on utilities system.” 
 
“Timing not anticipated (i.e. even if expected, don’t know when) with 
a significant impact on organization itself or on work organization 
needs to do.” 
 
Business as Usual “An event which by its impact threatens the financial, commercial 
stability of the organization or our ability to meet our obligations to 
our customers.” 
 
“Something that will seriously affect the running of the organization.” 
 
“An event that has material impact upon the business, its prospects or 
its reputation.” 
Resources “Any event outside of normal operations that places additional 
burdens on the organization in respect of capacity finance systems and 
procedures.” 
 
“Something which cannot be dealt with using normal resources” 
 
“one which overwhelms the organizations own resources (or threatens 
to)” 
 
Structural Conditions of Power  
All organizations had publicly expressed their concern to make managing risks in the face of 
extreme events a priority (via Annual Reports, Chairman’s communications, for example).     
However, a strong theme emerging from the data was that the ‘dominant coalition’ of 
powerful interests who shaped decision making remained substantially an unchanging small 
group of senior managers who had historically controlled the strategic decision making  
process.  Typically, this small group would comprise the CEO, the COO, the Finance 
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Director and other senior managers (often Board members) and would not include the 
business continuity managers. This group would also neglect to consider and discuss 
information submitted to them by the business continuity managers and others outlining risks 
(we deal with the difficulty of getting discussion of extreme events on the agenda in a later 
section in this paper).   As informants explained: 
“The Board treats business continuity as a function in the organization rather than as a 
need to make strategic decisions” (financial services manager) 
 
“We struggle to get buy in at senior levels” (Local authority manager) 
 
“We don’t know what goes on at senior decision making levels – we are excluded” 
(police force manager). 
 
The data begin to support a structurally conditional view of power with a small, highly 
contingent group of senior managers either ‘constricting’ decision making to themselves 
(Hickson et al., 1986) or utilising their contingent power to keep decisions concerning 
extreme events off the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974).  In Clegg’s 
(1989:97) terminology, power and authority are ‘co-aligned around the axis of legitimacy’.  
The most senior decision making team restricts power to decide (or not) over particular topics 
(such as the threat of extreme events and organizational preparedness) to a small number of 
senior managers and authority is vested in this small elite group.   In support of Miller et al’s 
(2008) findings we also found the composition of this elite group largely unchanging over 
time.    
A second structural feature of power appeared related to organizational rather than authority 
structures.   Many of the sample organizations had a central headquarters and multiple 
regional units’ structure.  Whilst the theory of high reliability organizations would suggest 
decentralised decision making in the regional units would be more effective than centralized 
decision making in dealing with high levels of uncertainty posed by extreme events, our data 
indicated that the majority of such organizations centralised decision making at the centre, in 
headquarters.  For example:  
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“Our HQ is in London and we’re based in Birmingham, we do not have any decision makers 
here.  They are all in London” (Financial Service manager) 
 
“...(this creates)..the problem of us (in the regions) allowing HQ to make decisions for us” 
(Utility manager) 
 
“ we have no capacity to make quick decisions which are needed...we cannot get approval for 
that....the organizational culture doesn’t allow decision making at lower (decentralised) 
levels...they all need to be taken up to the board in HQ”  (Rescue Services Manager) 
 
These findings lend more support to a political view of decision making restricted to a small 
and centralised group (in this case the board or senior team at HQ).  In this respect, our 
organizations present strong evidence for power being exercised in a classic Weberian sense 
(Weber, 1968).  The hierarchical structuring of both managerial and organizational offices 
and their centralised relation to one another is strong evidence for this interpretation. 
As Brunsson and Olsen (1993:36) argue, such centralisation is likely to lead to an 
information (or knowledge) gap in which “insufficient attention (is given) to local knowledge 
and local needs for specialization and adaption”.    Our data point to this being a key issue 
across the sample organizations: 
“...that knowledge existed within the organization but I know as a matter of fact that it was not 
acted upon or considered by senior managers....”   (Utility manager). 
 
“ It seems very important to pick the right people in the organization to lead this type of work 
(decisions on preparedness and extreme events).  And it is not always the senior people who 
are the best people at doing this.  Some of the more junior people with fewer ties, more 
ambition and knowledge...they can be absolutely fantastic in these sorts of situations”   
(Financial Services manager). 
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“..those people (senior managers) are making business decisions Monday to Friday… they are 
probably very gifted at doing this....but it takes a completely different individual trained 
differently and with different knowledge to be able to react to that (extreme events) 
environment.  The structure that runs the airport Monday to Friday is not the structure that I 
would want to be deployed in the event of a major catastrophe”   (Airport manager). 
 
The data also point to the relatively unchanging nature of the above structural analysis of 
centralisation and control by a small group of senior managers.   Informants indicated that 
decision making had always been centralised with little evidence of change, across a range of 
decision topics.  In effect, centralised control had become institutionalised. 
Such an analysis takes us from a relatively simple structural analysis of power to a more 
processual view, reflected in much of the recent literature in organization theory (e.g.  Van de 
Ven and Poole, 2005; Langley, 1999; Chia and Holt, 2006).   As Pajunen (2008) points out, 
much of the persistence of power in a small group of senior managers can be seen as 
evidence of organizational ‘mechanisms’ where the activities of practice (in this case decision 
making) become a stable collection of component parts which cannot be individuated.  They 
represent institutionalised sets of actions and processes which become taken for granted and 
are replicated over time.  This accords with Giddens’ (1979, 1984) concept of structuration 
whereby the actions of agents in time one (in this cases managers making strategic decisions) 
become the structures and institutionalised processes of time  two, where rigidities of action 
and involvement become fixed and often hard to change.  Behaviours become fixed as 
routines for action (such as decision making) and associated values, interests and beliefs give 
meaning and reinforcement to such actions.  As March and Olsen (1984, 1989) note, every 
organization has a history which in turn sediments and stabilises a whole range of processes, 
structures and actions.  In the terms of this paper, power becomes sedimented and focussed 
on a small group of senior managers who control the processes and outcomes of strategic 
decisions.  The older the organization, the more institutionalised the process of decision 
making becomes it seems: 
“(We are) an older organization. Decision making is slow and restricted to a few 
senior managers.  We need considerably quicker responses to crises and do things at 
multiple levels but it doesn’t happen. For example, after the 7th July terrorist attack in 
London, we had no capacity to make quick decisions and we couldn’t get statements to 
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the media as quickly as we would have liked”   (Financial Service Organization 
manager) 
 
This recursive nature of agency and structure and the build-up of institutionalised practices, 
leads to the second part of this analysis.   In theory, the installation of business continuity 
managers and teams and the high levels of uncertainty inherent in preparing for extreme 
events should break the bounds of institutionalised practice by bringing significant change to 
current processes and actions.  Yet our data indicate the opposite is the case.  Decision 
making remains centralised as uncertainty and ambiguity increase: 
“Such decisions are framed as investment decisions and no-one other than the senior 
team has any authority to decide upon investment.  This goes to senior management” 
(Transport Infrastructure Organization manager) 
 
Simply revealing that centralisation and control are the norm in our sample does not answer 
the question of possible reasons why this balance of power is maintained and reinforced.  We 
address this question in the next section. 
 
Decisional Conditions of Power and Decision Making 
In addition to the organizational perception of extreme events, the issue of whether and how 
organizations prioritize avoiding or minimising elements of risk from unprecedented or 
unplanned events prevails.  Four decision centred patterns emerged from the data.  These 
were  a) muddling through; deciding not to engage in specific business continuity planning 
meaning that the organization does not take pre-emptive action to prepare for extreme events;  
b) engaging in symbolic planning activities, but never allowing this to transcend the 
rhetorical domain and hence planning is not translated into practice;  c) decisions continue to 
be made by a relatively stable set of (structurally) empowered individuals over time and that 
organizations perform and reproduce the (appearance) of rational forms; d)  business 
continuity managers (and their perceived normative arguments) are viewed as disruptive to 
the existing power constellation not least because the accepted language of decision making 
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is calculative (Power, 2007) and the basis of organizing for profit or optimal efficiency (e.g. 
best-value public sector orgs.).   We explore these findings in turn below. 
 
a) Muddling Through 
 
Two quotes illustrate the range of responses one from an SME, the other from a large 
complex organization. 
 
“Small businesses being prepared is not worth it.  I don’t have BC plan for my own 
business.  It doesn’t merit it. We are practical, we take a pragmatic view, to just muddle 
through.  We know that, in essence, the time taken to create, maintain and review all 
the possibilities is quite a cost if you’re not big enough and can’t afford it.” (Small 
Business Manager) 
 
“Things happen all the time, what do we have to tell the public? The public do strange 
things! There’s a lot of complacency, we have been here 175 years and what’s the 
problem? We have survived bombs in WW2; we have lots of glass; lots of celebrities; 
it’s about making the right decisions.”  (Senior Manager, Exhibition and Convention 
Centre). 
 
The decision to not engage in activities of risk-avoidance was seen where managers could not 
justify the cost of calculating risk in the first instance or second that there were so many 
potential risks to prepare for, it was impossible to prepare for everything.  No calculation of 
risk could be presented.  The former response was seen amongst small businesses and SMEs 
who saw the burden of pre-emptive action as too expensive.  The latter response was seen in 
where there were no calculative means on which to make a decision.  The de facto position 
was therefore to decide what to do once an extreme event had occurred, not before. 
The decision to muddle through meant that in an extreme event the expectation was that the 
organization must be seen to make the ‘right’ decision as defined by the dominant coalition)  
and that it was the role of other agencies (e.g. local government and emergency services) to 
ensure a return to business as usual should an event occur. 
 
b) Engaging in symbolic decision activities 
22 
 
 
Organizations which typically engaged in what we call symbolic decision activities manage 
decisions concerning extreme events by ensuring that they are treated as ‘box-ticking’ 
procedures.  Typically, this comprised organizations in the health and financial services 
sectors (although this was not exclusive to these sectors with other organizations in the 
sample prone to similar symbolic activities).  The power of the dominant coalition manifested 
itself as reducing being prepared for an extreme event to a series of checkpoints which, once 
ticked, indicated a high level of preparedness.  Business continuity managers were seen as 
peripheral to this process at worst and, at best, were seen as basic administrators of a box-
ticking process.  For example one informant in the National Health Service explained: 
 
All you have to do is ensure you conform - you want to have ticks in all the boxes with 
the Department of Health. That’s all that is needed. (NHS manager) 
 
The influence of the dominant coalition in this case is predominantly characterised by being 
able to characterise decisions concerning extreme events as ‘operational’ rather than 
‘strategic’ hence both downgrading their status in terms of organizational importance and 
precluding the participation of a wider set of interests in decision making (see Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974). 
 
A related characteristic was the use of deprecatory discourse to describe business continuity.  
In the main, this took the form of describing such decisions as being forced on organizations 
as a form of externally imposed regulation.  For example: 
 
We just see business continuity as yet another burden.  It is a form of regulation and no 
more (Financial Services Manager). 
 
One result of such description was that senior managers in the dominant coalition tended to 
describe any decision making activity surrounding business continuity as problematic: 
 
It’s one big hassle (Financial Services Manager). 
 
Again, the power of the dominant coalition is preserved and maintained by the use of such 
descriptions and discourse. 
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Finally, some organizations had instated business continuity managers or similar roles and 
seemingly undertook measures to appear prepared for uncertainties.  Yet this was not always 
the case since the dominant coalition again took charge of defining and characterising such 
decisions.  As Carruthers (1995:318) explains,  “In particular, institutional processes are 
routinely disguised as technical ones.  Decoupling plays an important role in this process, for 
it allows an organization to maintain its institutionally prescribed appearances (via formal 
structure) without having to compromise actual operations.” 
 
c) Maintaining Structural Conditions of Power 
 
This emerged as a strong theme across the sample.  Linked closely to some of the rhetorical 
and symbolic processes described above, power and influence were retained by the dominant 
coalition by means of a number of actions and processes.  First, managers in the coalition 
argued along apparently rational cost or scarce resource lines.  Taking decisions on 
preparedness involves significant costs.  To justify such costs would mean an acceptance of 
such decisions as core business.  However, as two informants argued: 
 
Resilience benchmarks boil down to cost, how much prepared to spend. Business 
continuity doesn’t drive business it supports it; It is down to how much cash you want 
to spend (Financial Services Manager) 
 
It takes resources away from what our core business is (Transport Manager) 
 
Secondly, such arguments were typically reinforced by discussions of profit or, more 
accurately, decisions about business continuity were seen as unlikely to contribute to either 
profit or greater organizational efficiency.  For example: 
 
That knowledge [about extreme events] existed within the organization, and that I know that 
as a matter of fact, but it wasn’t acted upon I presume because of cost and it’s been lobbied 
for 30 years and they refused to, because it was a profit thing.  (Utility Manager). 
 
Such processes reinforce the potency of the dominant coalition in the way theorised by Miller 
et al (2008) but other factors also appear to reinforce this potency when examining extreme 
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events.  This is because dealing with preparedness for extreme events brings with it high 
levels of uncertainty.  An event may not happen. 
 
It is very much a situation which might never happen; so you check as you don’t want to go 
too far it’s about striking a balance. Financial risks are nearly always considered greater 
importance” (Utility Manager). 
 
These expressions reflect that extreme events (by their very nature) are uncertain. Whilst 
there was variation as to whether organizations presented extreme events as the unpredictable 
‘black swan’ discussed by Taleb (2007:36) or as something more calculable and controllable, 
the problem of lobbying for investment on the basis of an extreme hypothetical scenario was 
a consistent theme. The data revealed evidence that ‘established’ risks were given higher 
priority on the decision agenda than business continuity.  
 
“business continuity risk is looked at bi-annually whilst financial risk is looked at much more 
frequently” (Senior Manager: Economic Lifeline Organization). 
 
 Hypothetical scenarios dealing with predominantly endogenous shocks in the form of 
extreme events arguably lack the appearance of certainty and proven benefit associated with 
established organizational practices. In part this may be due to the inability of business 
continuity to frame its proposals in terms of a calculative ideal based upon numbers and 
economics (Power, 1997:121) as hypothetical scenarios of extreme events may fail to align to 
established probabilistic and cost-benefit analysis techniques. 
 
As the Historian Hallet-Carr (1961) reminds us, the risk of identifying and prioritizing a 
scenario that never materializes (a ‘false positive’) is something which places the 
‘scaremongers’ in a relatively power-less position and Knights et al (2008:304) in analyzing 
the millennium bug note that this becomes a “morally and politically loaded process”:   
 “[extreme events].... very much might never happen; check as you don’t want to go too far 
it’s about striking a balance” (Utility Manager). 
 
 “investment when something hasn’t happened (millennium bug for example) is not likely, 
someone made a lot of money. Do you know who to listen to, who is the expert?”  
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There is arguably a professional risk for business continuity managers in predicting an 
extreme event which never impacts upon an organization.  Despite costly preparations, failure 
to prioritize an extreme event which does occur (false negative) but has not been seen to be 
planned for may be damaging.  In addition, a costly false positive (e.g. the millennium bug) 
could threaten to undermine future claims about the need for investment and potentially the 
status of business continuity managers and their equivalents as experts in their field. 
 
Although there are difficulties with predicting extreme events business continuity managers 
may be reticent to present their role ‘as more akin to a craft skill than a science’ (Power. 
1997: 121) as this may draw business continuity further away from established organizational 
norms at a time when “business continuity is trying to rise from the bottom” (economic 
lifeline business continuity manager).  As discussed earlier, the data indicated that business 
continuity managers often lack the authority to act.  Their decisions could be over-ridden and 
over-ruled by senior executives in the dominant coalition: 
 
“The meddling aspect of senior executives [results in] conflict and confusion in 
understanding and clarifying roles, responsibility and authority to act” Economic 
lifeline Manager 
 
 “often work is 'wasted' as 'guts' are used (by senior managers) to decide rather than 
analysis” Computer Network Manager 
 
The relative powerless-ness of business continuity managers from these perspectives is 
closely aligned to classic Sociological analyses of class or social stratification (see 
Wesolowski, 1979 for example).  Taking a functional perspective to the unequal division of 
power, and building on the work of Parsons (1954) and Davis and Moore (1945), 
Wesolowski argued that functional structures such as organizations would, over time, display 
sharp inequalities in who (or which groups) had a strong voice in decisions over key issues 
and that what were defined as key issues would, in turn, be defined by stratified variations in 
power.  From these perspectives, the roots of power lie in what are more or less defined and 
accepted as ‘functional requirements’ of organization (business as usual rather than 
preparedness for extreme events in the case of this paper).  Somewhat ironically, Davis and 
Moore’s (1945) notion of ‘functional necessities’ (those functions needed to keep the 
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organization working safely, smoothly and help growth) which were heavily criticised as 
being too universal by later Sociologists have re-entered today’s organizational vocabulary, 
albeit using different (but nonetheless universal) terminology such as ‘resilience’ (see 
Cornish, 2007). 
 
d) Business continuity and threats to established power structures in organizations. 
Unexpectedly, the data revealed that the actions of business continuity managers may be 
perceived not as a ‘functional necessity’ but as a threat to the established power structure.  
This seemed to be largely due to the actions of business continuity managers cross-cutting 
established (and often separate) organizational functions. For example, a business continuity 
manager from an economic lifeline organization was aware that in their role that they “had to 
cut across the normal organizational structure”. This was perceived by the dominant 
coalition as potentially threatening to their established (and functionally derived) power 
bases. The work of business continuity managers requires them to propose broad (sometimes 
universal) decisions or measures of integration in relation to other departments.  Business 
continuity and resilience managers may, therefore, be perceived as a driver for integration 
which threatens established norms of departmental independence and/or specialization in 
organizations. As one informant described it: 
 
“ there is a problem of allowing another part of the organization to make a decision for 
you”.  (Senior Manager, Government Agency) 
 
Secondly, in order to plan for hypothetical scenarios (such as the evacuation of headquarters) 
a business continuity manager may create further threats.  Such a manager may be placed in a 
role where they are suggesting the introduction of processes which question or transgress 
established organizational norms:  
 
 “any business is about making money; you don’t get buy in for doing tests; don’t get buy in 
from senior management. They are not going to let 30 people off for the afternoon”. (Senior 
manager: Economic lifeline).   
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Summary 
The data indicate that managers generate a contextually situated perception of extreme 
events, but a uniform understanding of extreme events is that they will affect business as 
usual and disrupt the resources of an organization.  It is common, and in some sectors 
mandatory, for organizations to instate business continuity managers within the formal 
organizational hierarchy.   
However, for issues of business continuity to make the agenda in strategic decision making 
(one of Lukes’ 1974 key conditions of power) the significance of extreme events appears to 
necessitate communicating threats and risks in calculative terms.  This chimes with the 
findings of Hoskin and Macve (1994).  The data reveal that organizations vary in their 
prioritisation of extreme events.  Prioritisation is, however, not solely a function of power 
struggles to represent preparedness in the language of the dominant coalition.  A small group 
of organizations in the study did prioritise preparedness.  These were organizations operating 
with continuous, or near-continuous, production typically placed business continuity as an 
operational imperative.  Because the continuity of production or functioning of the 
organization is so closely linked to profit and performance, some form of rational calculation 
is a normal practice in assessing any shocks to business as usual: In this sense these 
organizations engage in managing risk and uncertainty by rational strategies such as 
calculation of possible negative outcomes by provision and insurance (Table 1: Zinn, 2008) 
against extreme events. 
 
Business continuity managers were often faced with competition for scarce resources within 
their organization and continuity initiatives were regularly sidelined as they were not 
considered part of core business activity.  Business continuity initiatives are appraised against 
established business functions and in the context of existing power relations.  These included 
the dislocation of business continuity from the domain of profit or efficiency.  The 
hypothetical nature of risk and the abstracted probabilistic nature of extreme events means 
that other types of risk are mostly prioritised, especially those of a financial nature.  The 
speculative tasks involved in the practices of business continuity managers often served to 
undermine their ‘expertise’; the juxtaposed balance of preparing for something that is never 
seen to happen or dealing with the aftermath of an unforeseen occurrence means that the 
credibility of continuity management is often in flux.  The measures put in place, or 
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suggested, by continuity managers can be overridden by media coverage (what is the latest 
scare?) and the consequent gut reactions of senior managers placing continuity managers in a 
reactive role further distancing them from the central arena of strategic decision making.   
 
Conclusions 
Strategic and operational decisions continue to be made along calculable lines.  Stratification 
of power in organizations is, to a large extent, maintained by what can be measured or 
presented in a calculative format (Hoskin and Macve, 1994).  
This paper suggested that, by increasing levels of uncertainty (such as in the context of 
extreme events) such relatively stable stratification may be subject to change and the balance 
of power may tip in favour of those proposing organizational preparedness.  However, the 
data do not support such a view.  It seems that the existence of large organizational structures 
not only creates inequalities in power between interests or functions, but maintains them 
independently of levels of uncertainty. 
The findings of this research reveal the position of ‘resilient practices’ such as business 
continuity to be an illegitimate logique d’action (Karpik, 1972) for UK organizations.  This 
suggests that there is a hiatus (Meyer and Rowan 1991) between the institutionalised 
calculative order of strategic decision making and their business continuity practices unless 
the risk can be expressed in calculable terms (Power, 1992).  Because the activities of 
business continuity managers involve assessing their own organization to propose initiatives, 
these can be perceived to threaten the established power balance in the organization.  Where 
the threat of extreme events cannot be calculated, or communicated in calculable terms, 
business continuity managers experience ‘decoupling’ effects (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) 
between the organizational practice and the politics of strategic decision making.  As a result, 
the power constellation around the dominant coalition remains unchanged. 
Decisions to prepare for extreme events are often decoupled from the organizational practice 
of preparedness.  The extant constellations of power continue to behave in a ‘rational’, albeit 
institutionally legitimate, mode of managerial calculative rationality.  The culture, resources 
and practice of initiatives like ‘business continuity’ and ‘disaster planning’ conflict with the 
established ‘rational’ considerations of strategic and board level decisions. Hence, while 
organizations were often restructured to meet the needs of the Civil Contingencies Act and 
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hence to address risks from extreme events, the practitioners of preparedness often 
experienced decoupling unless the risks are presented in quantitative discourse, illustrating a 
calculatively rational course of action. And even then, such decisions are given lower priority 
by the dominant and unchanging coalition who exerted power over the processes and 
outcomes of decision making. 
The data presented here reveal some key insights into strategic decision making as a political 
activity.  In particular, there is little or no evidence to support Cohen et al.’s (1972) notion of 
fluid participation of interests alongside conditions of high ambiguity or problematic 
preferences.  Such anarchy (as these authors described it) appears not to be the case, at least 
in the highly ambiguous context of preparedness for extreme events.  Rather, the structural 
and decisional elements of power seem to play an important role in defining, shaping and 
maintaining the composition of the key power constellation, the dominant coalition. The 
findings reveal strong tendencies of recursive concentration of decision making in the hands 
of a few powerful interests, which effectively precludes either business continuity managers 
having a voice in decision making, or having any influence over key decisions. 
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Endnotes 
1.  There is, of course, a counter argument which suggests that the division of labour in an 
organization is essentially egalitarian since the division of labour and control are directed 
solely at the market rather than internally in organizational power struggles.  From this 
perspective, the market (and market signals) are the key influence over decision making and 
not organizational elites. 
2.  This observation of strategy being a pattern in a stream of successive decisions was more 
famously developed some years later by Henry Mintzberg in his writings on strategy. 
3. The premier lobbying organization for UK business on national and international issues; 
works with the UK government, international legislators and policymakers to help UK 
businesses compete effectively. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Example Descriptions and/or Definitions of an ‘extreme event’? A selection of responses from 
informants. 
A one off large scale widespread crisis which may or may not be unpredictable. 
An effect which prohibits business functioning at 100% for a prolonged period of time more than 5 days. 
An event that demands a sustained response over and above the day to day working of our organization. 
An event that has material impact upon the business, its prospects or its reputation. 
An event that is larger than a major incident and is national or regional instead of local e.g. weather 
(wind, rain, snow), global, virus, oil prices etc. 
An event that is so influential that normal operation becomes impossible for a period of time. 
An event that requires our incident management capability to be "stood-up" as it is likely to impact on our 
ability to work as business as usual. 
An event that significantly disrupts the normal pattern of life e.g. terrorist attack. 
An event which has a severe business impact (ability to function normally is impaired) to the extent that 
abnormal measures are required to restore normality. 
An event which stretches our ability to carry out our primary function to a level which is at or beyond our 
limits. 
An occurrence that affects the organizations ability to carry out its essential functions. The extremity is 
judged by the effect. 
Any event outside of normal operations that places additional burdens on the organization in respect of 
capacity finance systems and procedures. 
Any event which requires significant deployment of resources and/ or impact on national security. 
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Anything which is unplanned which interferes with service delivery in the everyday life in the 
community. 
Challenges the organization beyond the bound of what it is used to / able to deal with. 
Either the inability to provide employees with a place to carry out their work (perhaps because of a loss 
or damage to a building) or a health or transport issue preventing attendance at work place. 
Event that would require additional response and resources beyond standard operating procedures and 
which may threaten the continued existence of operating. 
It's about a personal perspective. Any event that seriously disrupts the organizations continuity does not 
confuse major disasters such as pandemic and tsunami with this. 
Loss of supply of water to a population of 720,000 people for more than 24 hours. Terrorism or other 
occurrence which leads to contamination of water supplies and risk to human health 
One that requires the organization to invoke its contingency procedures in terms of work area, data centre 
etc. Due to not being able to operate normally you have to move into crisis management. 
Something highly disruptive and above normal operations and something organizations feel unprepared 
to handle. Could be one of countless scenarios but they will "know it when it HITS and HURTS them". 
Often think in terms of physical/ environmental disasters e.g. fire, flood, rather than wider spectrum of 
types. 
Something that happens unexpectedly which impacts / affects the health and safety of residents / staff or 
prevents organization from functioning - e.g. flood,/ fire/ robbery/ loss of building (collapse or explosion/ 
death/ sabotage/ IT failure/ utilities. 
Something which cannot be dealt with using normal resources. 
Something which stops me running a train service and threatens cash. A good example was when in 2005 
a tunnel collapsed on the line and blocked it for 7 weeks. This is hopefully exceptional. 
That which appears to be above the threshold level of the ordinary day to day; will need an out of the 
usual plan to deal with the extreme events. 
Uncertainty - level of disruption does not have to be huge, e.g. Exeter restaurant bomb. IT breakdown 
could cause the banking sector not to function. 
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